H.B. 182 Genetic Information Amendments: transcript

Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee. Um, I'll actually be speaking to the second sub. Okay. So when the time's ready to adopt that. Yep. I have with me today, Adam Gardner and online Dr. Jackie deal. Um, if there's further questions, then they'll, they'll, I'm gonna give a few moments as part of our presentation, if that's okay with you. Yep. So, um, this bill, um, it may look familiar because we've already went through this before. It was, uh, went through last year, passed unanimously on the house. And because I've not always on the floor of the house, especially in the last, it sat there and sat there and it died there because we ran outta time. And so I'm trying to be really proactive and get this stuff done early. Anyway, this is genetic information amendments. It's, it's, um, basically about privacy. So we, we know that there, we have data se sequencers in our, or excuse me, DNA sequencers in our, in our state. And they provide valuable resource to, um, scientists and other people who are trying to study us and how it works and, and, and different entities like that. But, um, some of these machines have components that actually have a backdoor to them and ship that information, which is about the most sensitive of your personal information to people who should not have it. So this bill addresses that issue and, and puts into place some, some safeguards and some requirements that they make sure that they are indeed taking care of our protection. So I'd like to give, um, Jackie a few minutes and then, um, um, Mr. Gardner as well. I think she's online actually. Adam, since you're here, Mr. Vice Chair, would that be okay for him?

Sure. I'll be very quick. Uh, thank you Mr. Vice Chair. Um, I represent, my name is Adam Gardner. I represent State Armor, which is a nonprofit advocacy group. Um, and since we've worked on this last year, uh, the federal government has taken action where no federal monies can be spent at all on these technologies that are based out of adversarial countries, um, which is great news. And since then, we've had a number of states that have adopted legislation to do exactly what we're trying to do here. And they are Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Texas. They've all enacted legislation to help solve, uh, this problem that Representative Brooks is looking to solve. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh, my name is Jackie Deal, and I'm based in Washington, DC I've been researching the Chinese Communist Party and its military for about two decades. I'm also on the advisory board of State Armor. Um, I testified on an earlier version of this bill last year. So I want to thank Representative Brooks for his continuing leadership on this important issue. There is reason to believe that the Chinese Communist Party, unfortunately, is collect, clean, collecting the genetic information of Americans to develop racially tailored bio weapons that hurt Americans, but spare Chinese people. In 2016, a Chinese general and the head of Chinese National Defense University published a book stating quote, in the development of biotechnology today, the most lethal weapons are genetically engineered weapons designed to attack people based on their specific ethnic or racial background, causing specific races to become ill, such as suffering immune deficiency, loss of intelligence, sterilization, or even death while leaving other races unscathed. Senior Chinese military officers also write of the need to establish, quote, biological dominance and biological deterrence. These terms mean that they believe they, if they demonstrate the ability to weaponize new genetic manipulation techniques such as crispr, other countries will feel fear them and be deterred from responding. For instance, if China were to invade another country to achieve such biological dominance, the Chinese Communist Party has sponsored the rise of a company called Beijing Genomics Institute, BGI, which makes sequencing machines and performs sequencing services. The Chinese Communist Party subsidizes this company, enabling it to underprice foreign competitors, and also to buy up foreign competitors. Um, so when American facilities use these sequencers or the sequencing services, unfortunately there's a high likelihood that Americans genetic data goes to China, and specifically to servers owned by Huawei, uh, which is a military Chinese military linked telecommunications company that has actually been banned from the United States. The federal government, as was just mentioned, um, has, has sanctioned this company. Um, and, and Congress just passed the Bios secure act, meaning that no federal monies can go to facilities, uh, for the use of the services, the sequencing, or the sequencers from this company. So states such as Utah, therefore have an opportunity to act, to protect their residents and preserve, um, their eligibility for federal grant resources by banning the use of these hostile foreign, adversary linked genetic sequencers and software. Um, and I'm happy to answer any questions. As was mentioned, Texas, Idaho, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Nebraska have all passed versions of this bill. Thank you.

Thank you. So, um, this goes quite far, you see, for the potential for, um, negative effects on it. But it comes down to the fundamental principle is as we, as a state, one of our obligations, to make sure that our, our private information is protected. And that's what this bill is intended to do.

Thank you, Mr. Oh, Testing, 1, 2, 3, go. Thank you. Uh, thank you, Mr. Chair, and, uh, uh, thank you representative for, uh, bringing this bill. It's, uh, uh, something that I hadn't thought about and, uh, now you've given me a lot to think about. Uh, so hopefully you don't mind if I have a couple of questions to ask you to clarify my understanding. Um, so looking at the, uh, my first question regards, uh, a penalty. This is, um, my understanding, this would be a civil action that would be taken on behalf of the Attorney General's office. Correct. Um, and, uh, have you spoken with the Attorney General's office? Would they have the capacity, the ability to sort of enforce this?

Absolutely. In fact, if you look at the fiscal note, there's $0 addressed to it because it's part of the responsibility.

Excellent. Um, one thing that caught my eye here is it sounds like there's a, a collection of state governments that, uh, have already enacted this. Um, but this is a sort of thing that I would expect Congress to act on, is, is there any reason why the federal government hasn't acted on this and why there's a gap here?

Well, I think they've tried to, to make, um, different rules in place to try to protect us, but as a state, we still have a lot of room to do what we need to do here in the state. And that's why, if you notice that most policies that the Federal Government Act is because the states acted first. I think that we're a little more nimble and can act quicker, but it, it's just something that needs to be taken care of. And I think we can address it quicker. Now, we have, in fact, I'd lean to Adam here a little bit on this. A lot of the bills that we do here in Utah is what the federal government looks at and what other states look at. Because we do, um, react quickly, we do our due diligence. We go through and vet it and make sure that we have good policy.

Can I add something to that? Yes, please. Um, they, Congress passed the BIOS secure act. It was bipartisan, it was in the NDAA last year that dealt with this very issue. And that's what pro what prevented federal monies from being spent on any of this technology. Now, what that means, especially for Utah, it's not just, it's not just some Washington DC foreign policy thing, um, but it makes sure that our research universities still have access to research funds. If they're using any of these technologies, they wouldn't be eligible for research funds. So, to, to my knowledge, no institutions in Utah are using any of those technologies. Uh, but this kind of cuts that, that, uh, company BGI off at the knees.

Okay. Uh, and, and you kind of allude to something that also caught my interest. Um, would this meaningfully affect, uh, our academic institutions, those us doing genealogical research and medicine? Um, would this inhibit, uh, our ability to research

If you No, it won't. In fact, last year we, we addressed a lot of those issues and make sure that there was a timing. You notice it doesn't take effect till 2027. So if there is such hardware that they're able to replace it. 'cause they're just as, um, it just as important to them to protect our personal data that is to us. So they've been a great partner of trying to making sure that they are in compliant.

And, uh, one final question. 'cause thinking along the lines of, uh, academia, uh, I suppose it's not impossible to envision like a doctrinal candidate from Russia or, or China studying, uh, uh, geology or medicine in the United States. And if they were to, to take their laptop home on like a trip, would they be in violation of the statute?

I'm gonna lean to Adam on This. No, they would not. What we're trying to protect is, I, I think there's some probably laws already in place about that. Um, but what we're trying to do is the har, a lot of people don't know what's in our hardware. Um, there's another bill that I, you'll hear for me later that is on our water pumps that has malware, that allows a remote person to access it and turn 'em on and off, whether it's putting chlorine and taking it out there. This is what we're finding out in these, these last few years, is, um, we have to make sure that our equipment does not have remote capabilities to people who are not supposed to address, get ahold of them. That answers my questions.

Thank you so much. I appreciate it. I know that was a lot of questions, but I Appreciate Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh, I, I like the bill. I think it's, it's, uh, definitely the right direction. Um, one thing, and I, and, and maybe this is an observation as a whole, I, I wish we would look at things, uh, as a way of incentivizing people to change rather than saying, we're going to penalize you if you don't. Um, so, you know, as, as we look forward, uh, probably some kind of incentive would be more palatable to the, to the business community and, and probably to the general public. Um, so I, but I, but I do support the bill. Um, and, and, uh, it doesn't end with this because they're, they're, uh, they're finding our genetic sequence of all of our plants, and they're writing, they're writing, uh, DNA sequence for ways to attack our food supply. I mean, it, it goes big. And, and it's the same problem. It's in embedded in all of this equipment that we're using here in the United States. And when we, when we sequence our plants, then they look at it and say, okay, well here's their genetic sequence and here's how we break it down. So in a sense, we're already at war, but we've gotta do everything we can to protect it. This is the first step as human life. Um, but I, I think it's only a first step. We need to, we need to take this stuff serious. Thank you. Thank

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh, appreciate this legislation. I think it's important. I think similar to Representative Shelley, I think it's an important conversation we should be having. Um, I just have a couple of questions just around the legislation in practice. Um, the question is, uh, back to your representative, um, on people don't know what's on the hardware. And so I guess in practice, how is a hospital or university supposed to clearly determine whether this equipment or software is tied to a foreign adversary, and are they protected if they act in good faith and still get it wrong?

I'm, I'm going to attempt to ask part of that. I'm gonna lean on Adam and, and Dr. Dale if we need to, but, um, we know which ones are bad. And so they're, they're pretty much identified. And like I said, all the partners and, you know, there's not people like in their basement doing data sequencing. This is like University institutes and, and big organizations. So we're not dealing with a whole lot of people that might just accidentally do it. And we do know which, which, um, sequencers are a problem. So that's, that's I think the root to your question, that I don't think that's gonna be an issue.

Yeah, that's a really, that's a really good point. That's accurate. Um, it's, it's important to note that BGI, uh, is using, uh, stolen technology from the United States and have been in litigation for a long time. The United States, uh, now does not allow anyone to buy these, uh, machines. So what they're doing is actually going in to partner with, with universities or other organizations and saying, you have free reign to use our equipment if you want to. That way you can still keep your federal money. And, and all they want is the storage. All they want is the data, and that's where we have a problem. But universities, uh, track this stuff pretty closely. They tracked band equipment, they tracked band lists, and what we're trying to prevent, um, is it, and I know Representative Shelley has seen this with his work on, um, with Farmers and other things where, uh, China is very adept at it. When you ban one thing, it's like playing whack-a-Mole. They create a shell company and, uh, a, a shell of a shell and, and move things around. And what this is, this doesn't want to name any specific companies, but, um, it follows the federal guidelines pretty closely and allows the state to, uh, kind of control their own destiny here and be able to save face and save our federal dollars in our research universities.

Awesome. And then just one more question, just looking at it again. In practice, if a non-compliant machine is used, um, does the bill um, leverage that fine of $10,000 for every patient or sample process, even while the facility's actively replacing the equipment? I, I'm just, if this is happening, one, we should replace it, but I, in practice, I realize that it's not something that's just, okay, it's today, let's get it out. Um, just worried about the fines being leveraged and how that's gonna roll out.

So this gives the lot of discretion to the Attorney General. And one of the issues was that very question last year. So that's why we gave enough time to make sure that everybody's knows what they're doing. There's compliance. So this is May of 2027 and December of 2027 is where they start telling the attorney generals that they're up to par. So on line, um, 88, it talks about it's a, a fine of $10,000 per violation, and that's up to the Attorney General. So we feel like if someone is still violating at that time, they're doing it purposely. So there's a lot of time to get this thing in order. We want it to be, you know, the, the state doesn't wanna, just, like Representative Shelley said, we're not just here to be punitive, but we need to have enough teeth in it to make sure that people will comply. Because this is a big dollar world if people want to use this nefariously. And I think most of the people that we know of and are working at it in the state are good actors. And so we want to put this clear. It's, there's not a lot of ambiguity here. You know, you do this correctly, which they want to do, or these are some potential penalties that, that do, could add up quickly. But the attorney General, we're not telling him what to do either or her. They're gonna be able to operate in, in good faith for the state. Great. Thank

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you. Um, are the medical facility and genomic research facility two different entities here, or are they the same? Um, in line 43, the medical facility receives public funds and appropriations from the federal government. Line 39 defines genome research facility, but does not list how it's funded. So could a genome research facility be privately funded?

Yes. Okay. Yes. And some, uh, in the state of Utah are non-profit funded. Okay. Um, and their parent non-profit can still receive federal and state funds. Okay. Um, but you have genomic facilities in the state. You have 'em used for research purposes in different companies. A lot of companies, research companies use genome sequencers, but you also, uh, can have genome facilities that a patient could go into and get DNA mapping and everything else. And that would be separate from a, a hospital or a hospital or a medical facility, or they could be the same thing depending on how they're funded.

Okay. Just wondering if it could cause problems restricting their research if it's seen as a breach of their right to property.

Um, if they, if they needed that equipment, then, uh, so far to our knowledge, that equipment doesn't exist in the state of Utah right now. So we're not seeing that. Um, theoretically if there was, if they needed to violate that, then that would be an interesting conversation. Yeah. We'd be willing to have, but we have not heard that concern. Okay.

Thank you. Lines 84 85, can the facilities decline to sign a sworn statement?

Yes, they can. And there's a significant fine, there Is a significant fine.

Mm-hmm. Wow, that's huge. Lines 1 0 7, 2 1 11. If the funding for the genomic research facility doesn't come from government, can the government still litigate here if they decide to determine to terminate their own employee?

I'm sorry, just a sec. What line?

Uh, 1 0 7 2 1 11. Oh, yeah. Okay. Oh, go ahead.

Sorry. No, go ahead, Adam.

This is the whistleblower, uh, statute. This essentially says if they, if a, if an employee sees a violation, um, of what's happening, then it would be, it would not be within the rights of the company to take punitive action against that employee. Okay.

I was just thinking of rights to property. If it's not, then it's not an issue, but I'm just curious if the funding isn't coming from government for their research, how they would approach that. Oh, and then line 1 0 7, how are they declining? Adverse employment action.

I think you might be reading from the first substitute on your line Oh. Rather than the second substitute. So I'm guessing you're down to 1 0 9. Is that where you're at?

Yes, probably. So, like how, How are they declining the adverse employment action?

Well, this is, this is a whistleblower. It doesn't have money care where the money's coming from. Okay. It's, it falls in the whistleblower statutes. Okay.

That's all I have. Thank you. Okay. Thank you.

Um, I have just a couple of questions. Um, maybe just one, talk to me about, um, the definition of foreign adversary and, and what that means in, in Utah's statute and how that complies with the federal statute, federal foreign

Adversary. It actually is the federal statute

That, that's correct. It is the federal statute. When we define foreign adversary, it's connected to the federal definition of a foreign adversary. So, so as, as, as we, as, as conditions change on the federal level, our state would change with that.

So, um, okay. That answers the question, so thanks.

I'm Executive Director of Utah Legislative Watch, and I'm here in support of this legislation. Um, I, the gal from Washington dc she, that was one of the things I wanted to say. I'll just say I agree with that. But I also wanted to mention, I, I know two, I have two friends, one that works for the FBI and one that works in foreign service. Um, working in assemblies, all of, um, what are they called? The AMBA Ambassadors. Ambassador Embassies, yeah. Yeah. Embassies. That's, that's the word. Um, working in embassies all over the world. They, they've been transferred to several countries. And interestingly enough, both of those people have told me the same story about China. When you go to China, they don't let you take any electronics at all whatsoever. And when you leave China, you have to leave all of your electronics, everything, because at some point, sometime somebody in China is going to have installed, um, software on your electronics that when you go home to the United States, it'll start tracking and sending data back to China. So, um, these are adversaries that we're talking about. We're not talking about friendly countries, we're talking about our adversaries. It just doesn't make any sense to not try and prevent us from handing over the information that they could need to do us harm. So thank you for your positive vote.

Hi, Delaine England. I'm representing Eagle Forum today, and I just wanted to thank Representative Brooks for this excellent bill. And I think really everything has been said. This is not just a matter of our personal data, which is so personal, so sensitive, and so important, and our constitutional right, but it's also a matter of national security. So I'm sure you're all bright enough to vote for this. So thank you so much. Appreciate it.

Yeah. So, Seth Stewart, uh, from American Fork, again, um, I do study in the space of genetic genealogy. And, uh, I think there's enough consensus that there are serious concerns with this. Bill's scope, its methods, and its implications. I agree with, uh, representative Shelley's recommendation not to make this a punitive bill, as well as another representative concern. It's not within the state's purview, but it's rather a federal matter if it's alleged that it's a security issue. And as far as security is concerned, cybersecurity, uh, one of the most basic and effective approaches recommended, uh, by experts is to air gap systems, disabled telemetry, and phone home mechanisms if they are present and so on. Um, it's, it's not a, a given that because an article has been manufactured in a certain country, that it necessarily therefore contains, uh, some form of data leakage instrument in it. Um, I, I would like to point out also, there's a very serious supply chain issue here because, um, the definition of, uh, what what constitutes a a final product, uh, is very vague. Um, if we were to apply this definition expansively, it would constitute virtually all computing equipment and, and software of any kind. Um, there are software dependencies that may be open source and very well vetted and proven, you know, hermetically not to contain any kind of a phone home mechanism. And my understanding is that this bill would prohibit those uses of, of, um, foreign sourced and, uh, internationally sourced, uh, software as well, uh, despite there being possibly a crucial component to these systems. Um, and as with the previous bill, there is a $10,000 per violation fee. Violation per violation is really not defined here, as has been noted by another representative. In the case of the previous bill, $3.65 million per annum if left unaddressed for a year, while an administrative limbo would, uh, not be a, that'd be an honest starter for any small tech company. And, uh, just if we were to apply the same standard to our other technologies, our data centers, et cetera, uh, virtually all of our microchips are manufactured or assembled and our computers and servers in, in China. And so if the concern is the data stewardship and safety and security, uh, I think we'd have to pull the plug on all of our, uh, all of our data centers, all of our tech companies, and all of our government operations with crater. And so I don't, again, I don't see this as really being about, uh, uh, transparency or security. Um, I, I believe consumer choice and disclosure if there is a known security vulnerability that that can be published. Um, but I'm just not seeing any, uh, any really, uh, actionable security recommendations since there are already means to assure the integrity of a system without needing to ban certain types of hardware software. So I would encourage you to, uh, not support. Thank

Thank you. Committee. My name is Nu Tonga. I am an ordinary citizen. And, um, I just wanted to make a comment. I think security, preparation and protection, especially of, um, our people, um, is an important thing. But as I was reading the bill, and actually as I read several of the bills, I find that sometimes in our efforts to prepare for the uncertainty, what comes across as not preparation, but fear, um, and the question that came to my mind was, is fear. The chi is preparation. The child of fear or of hope, and how do you discern the two? And I just wanted to make that comment to the council and committee as you're deliberating, not just this buildup further, because I feel like I, I've just seen in my own life and my life experience that anything motivated by fear and distrust is going to grow fear and distrust. And we already have a lot of that in our country. And so moving forward as we try to prepare for whatever may happen, and, you know, try to get ahead of the, I guess, the game that we are also growing hope and trust along the process, and not just feeding into the, this is happening and this is happening because that is also, um, detrimental to our people, you know, along with everything else that's happening in the world. All right. Thanks for your time. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Um, I would, I would like to propose that you remove line 1 0 5, um, that, that re

I Representative Shelley. Oh, I'm sorry. Are you talking to the second sub?

I don't see a second. Um, it's the, it's the line, the line that allows attorney's fees.

That, that's act that is actually line oh 5, 1 0 5. So basic line oh four says an inaction enforcement sub, um, subsection two or three, the General Attorney General may recover 1 0 5 actual damages. Yeah. So it's basically their effort to go through and try to stop this.

Yes. And, and what that means is the state's gonna win no matter what. And, and there may be, there may be a legitimate dispute. And yet, because the attorney general can recover whatever expense they want us to expend, and they have unlimited budget, they can, I mean, that's far exceeds the $10,000 penalty that those attorney's fees can be, be 10 times that. So I, I would just like it to be a fair playing field because there may be legitimate reasons why, why there's a, a mishap. I would just like to, to propose that you remove that.

Okay. I'm willing to talk about it. I, I think actual damages is actually defined, so it's not a runaway train that's, um, being suggested, but this is something that we have in a lot of parts of our code that I'm, I'm open to what the committee would like to do there. Um, anyway, but to, to talk about, if I may, Mr.

Yes, but I, so I'd like to address that then. So, um, line oh five, which we were talking about is actual damages and attorney fees. I would highly disagree with making an amendment to that. Okay. The whole purpose of the keeping this fiscal note down is only bad actors will have to pay these attorney fees We don't have, right now in Utah, everyone that's using these data sequencers understand the policy. They understand where it's going, and they're incompliant, they want to be incompliant. So I don't see this as being an issue. Uh, one of the testifiers talked about, um, any component or whatever, it, it'd be great if we read the bill because in line 69 it talks about that if you do have one of these type of machines that has this backdoor technology kind of thing, line 69, it says, remove or permanently disabled the genetic sequencer or genetic sequencing device. So basically disabled that function. So we've gone to great lengths, like I said, this went through last year, past unanimously on the, in the committee and in the house floor, because we did address these very issues. Like how do we keep this in a really narrow scope and make sure that we're not going out and just beating people with a stick. Um, this is not a fear bill because this is what's is happening. And this is something that not only industry, but our United States government and several other states are coming to mind. This is the solution. This is how we're gonna be able to provide some protections to stop this kind of adversarial attack on, on our data sequencing.

Could, could I ask a

Thank you, Mr. Shelly. So a follow up question before I go to that then. Is it, is it something that's technologically easy enough for the average person to figure out how to disable that?

Um, I wouldn't say average person, well,

Maybe not average person, but someone who's experienced could go in and disable that and it would cost somebody a couple thousand dollars to do or whatever.

I, I don't even think it cost that much. A company that has this type of equipment has an IT specialist that would be able to make that happen.

Fair enough. I support. Thank you. Okay.

No, I, I really appreciate everybody's participation in this. I mean, last year was a long time ago, and, um, maybe you have weren't in on this committee too as well, but I really appreciate, I think this type of, um, policy is really, really important. So the more that we get to understand it, and really it does take the fear out of it. 'cause this does have a lot of gie boogie kind of potential in it, right? That's a real word, by the way. Um, it, we really, we really wanna make sure that we're making good policy. And I think, um, this is not just something that's been drummed up really quick. It's been worked on for quite a long time, and I think it's in a good spot. So appreciate your time and attention today.

Good afternoon committee. Hello, Senator Buss. I haven't met you yet. Nice to meet you. If I, if I may, Mr. Chair, I, I have a, a fourth sub that I need to adopt.

Go ahead and place a motion to adopt fourth sub, uh, that I'm doing that because it looks like the sub before go back to the bill sponsor to explain that briefly. Sure. There's just some, um, last minute things that came from the industry that, that want to get changed. And so we put them in here to make it a little more easy to understand Discussion for committee.

So, as you aware, D-N-A-D-N-A sequencing is able to do some amazing things. Um, a few years ago in St. George, there was a, a baby born that was having troubles and they couldn't figure out what was wrong. And for two years, the, the family spent nearly a million dollars trying to figure out what was wrong with this infant. Well, they did A-A-D-N-A sequencing on it, found out that she didn't have enough B12, and they gave her B12 and it solved the problem. It was, it was amazing. But these DNA sequencing machines, they also found that they have sometimes some malware or some technology in it that allows it to be accessed from people who should not be accessing it. So the primary goal of this bill is to, is privacy of an individual. And their probably most private information is their DNA sequencing. So it just says that if they, if anybody in Utah is using these type of machines, that they are able, um, remove that, uh, part or, or disable, what is it able to allow it to be accessed remotely and, um, make they have a sworn statement with the ags office that they understand this is what they need to do every 10 years. That's basically it. Um, wonderful.

Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chair. Question to the sponsor, if that's okay. Um, on, so I'm looking at your new section that you added for the comparison to for two to four, correct? Mm-hmm. Substitute four. You did add, uh, in that line. So I guess subsection DI, genetic sequencing, data gathering as part of a clinical trial is exempt from provisions of the subsection three. Can you just explain that portion? Yeah,

Absolutely. So Line 83. So, so what we're trying to do is protect Americans that are getting their, um, DNA sequencing. However, there's other people across the world that have done it, and they allow that to be used to be able to study and test. Oh, okay. So we wanna make sure it's clear that if people are doing clinical studies and they're getting this data, that this doesn't prohibit them from using other people's data that they're offering.

Got it. So that, that just takes care of that portion. Yes. Excellent. Thank you. Thank you for that Mr. Chair

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh, Adam Gardner representing State Armor Network. This bill, uh, is important and I'd like to, uh, really give a lot of thanks to Representative Brooks here. We've worked on this bill for a couple of years. Last year it passed the house and it died, uh, up on the Senate board. Um, as so many things do go to die on the Senate board. Um, but we appreciate his work motion. Adjourn Speaking, like a motion to adjourn. Um, and I also, uh, wanna appreciate all the stakeholders that have been involved in this. Uh, over the last two years we've worked with, um, uh, with Bio Utah. They've been great partners in this as long, uh, as well as the University of Utah and their research folks. So we want to thank them as well. This bill is important because it establishes a kind of a defensive perimeter around our state's genomic infrastructure. And specifically it protects against two things. Uh, it addresses two vulnerabilities, the technology that we use and where we actually store the data. So, uh, it doesn't, we're not, this is not a, it's gotta be by American bill, uh, type of bill. It's, uh, that we don't want it coming from adversarial nations and we don't want our data stored in adversarial nations. That's all this bill does. So we think the good sponsor for all of his work on this.

Maryanne Christensen, executive Director of Utah Legislative Watch. And we are in support of this bill for a lot of reasons. Um, one being that our, um, genetic makeup is, it's actually the foundation of the building blocks of our creation. It's not something that we should take lightly and we do need to protect it. There are cases where adversarial countries are actually trying to produce bio weapons that attack us according to our, our genome. And they're having some success at that. So for us to protect it from our adversaries has become really critical. They might, they might try and steal that information, but we shouldn't be making it readily available. And so I appreciate the bill for shutting that down. Um, and I'll, I will not say the other part 'cause it's, it's just a really good bill, so it's just not needed. So thank

I think I'm getting all of my testimony outta the way in one hearing today, so thank you. Uh, Kelvin Cullimore with Bio Utah, we really appreciate Representative Brooks and working with us on this bill. Uh, the devices that are involved here can be very, very expensive devices. And, uh, they've narrowed the focus on this enough that we believe it's easy. We can comply with this within the industry and universities who may have devices like this either to disable them or replace them. And we really appreciate the fact that we've been given a two year runway to get this done. That makes a big difference in being able to amortize any costs that may be involved. So we really appreciate that. The, the 10 year reporting requirement, we're okay with, don't like it, but we're okay with it. I mean, we, I told well, he can call me in 10 years and, and maybe if we're both still here, we can go back and get everybody to report. So, uh, with that, uh, we really appreciate, uh, the way this bill has come about and been worked through and the, uh, amendments that have been accepted. So thank you.

Thank you Mr. Chair. I, I do have, uh, a proposed amendment that's a friendly amendment to the sponsor. If it's, um, appropriate right now to Make it's out. Yeah, that would've to be done during the other process. So we can either hold a bill here and do that next committee, Or do you wanna do it on the floor? I think we can do it on the floor. Okay. So then I remove that, um, comment. Mr. Jaren, I do wanna make a motion that we, um, pass, um, HB 180 2 4 substitute as substituted in the committee to, um, the Senate floor. That's in order. Do you wanna speak to that? Um, no. I, I I think this has been in the works. I know you've been working very hard representative. I appreciate that. And I understand the concerns of making sure we're protecting data and especially, you know, genetic data of, of, uh, Americans and putting those safeguards. And I think your amendment makes sense if industry needs a little bit more time, but we'll deal with that, um, sitting on the floor and, and with that, I think it's, it's a good policy. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for your time. I, I appreciate that. And we'll get the amendment. We is, our attorney says it doesn't make a big difference, but it makes the, the industry feel a little better about it. So I'm happy to make that amendment. But I appreciate your time today.

Second substitute House bill 180 2, genetic information Amendments by Representative Brooks. This bill was heard in Economic Development and Workforce Services with a vote of 8 0 2.

Thank you Mr. Speaker. It's my privilege to present this bill again. We went, this bill last year went all the way through our body, but it died on the cynex. We just ran outta time. Um, there's been some amazing things that we been able to do because of genetic sequencing or DNA sequencing. I can tell you the story of a, a young girl that's suffered terribly for years and, and her young age. So like zero to two, uh, in the hospital every single weekend. But because of DNA sequencing, they'll be able to find out that she had a vitamin B12 deficit. And after spending millions of dollars on hospital bills, that one piece where they were able gave the this child as B12 solved their problems. But there's a concern with these, um, sequencing machines is some of them have malware in them or built where other people can remote that acts that, uh, information remotely and pull it out. So this bill basically is a protection bill of privacy. It makes sure that any DNA sequencing machine does not have the capability to have a back door in it to get that information out, especially outside the country. And with that, I'm open to any questions.

I waive. Thank you very much. Summation

is the technology and all that's taking place. And one of those version technology is, is the notion concept of genetic data sequence sequencing, then, uh, DNA sequencing. It's, it's led to major medical advances. We want to keep that safe. That's what the bill is trying to do to keep it, keep this, uh, key and private information outta the hands of the wrong people. Bill requires the use of secure and trusted equipment that does not have or disabled the ability to be remotely accessed by unauthorized individuals or organizations. Uh, leading experts support this bill. It's been, has been, uh, supported through the process and to this point. Glad to answer any questions Mr. President?

Thank you. I'll waive summation and move the question that we pass.

Senator Vickers Baldy Lewin Bramer Bus Comore Escamia Fillmore Grover Harper Kinins Ipson Ipson Johnson Juab McKay Mikel Milner Musselman Owens Pitcher Plum Rebe Sandal Stevenson Stratton Bickers Weiler Wilson Winterton.

Sandall. Thank you. Motion to table on third fifth substitute House Bill 180 2 pending the fiscal note. Catching up.

Thank you Mr. President. We do have a, uh, another amendment that I'd like to adopt.

I show amendment. Looks like I've got it online. Just hold on.

What this amendment does is it, it's a additional safety valve for what we're doing here. The language is part of the clinical trial and storage transfer or remote access. The data is otherwise permitted. Uh, well

Correct. Okay.

Thank you Mr. President. What we're doing here is recognizing as we look at the, the whole aspect of the challenging. Some have referred to our, our technology as, as one of the most critical areas that we face in our, our, uh, current landscape of security. And part of that is protecting our are pro, pro protecting. Uh, a lot of, of our very sensitive information related to our genetic sequencing. And the genetic sequencing is dealt with genetic sequencing software. And what we're doing doing is we're putting in place safety, uh, safety, uh, procedures and policies to protect the DNA and the privacy of individuals against inappropriate use. With that, I'll be glad to lead you into any questions.

Thank you. I'll waive summation and, and move that, uh, fifth substitute HB 180 2 as amended to pass.

Senator Vickers Baldy. A Lewin Brammer Bus. Bus. A Cullimore Escamia Fillmore A Grover a Harper Kins Ipson Johnson Quan McKay Mikel Milner Musselman Owens Owens. Pitch Plum Sandal Stevenson Stratton Vickers Bier Wilson. Aye. Winterton President Adams Aye.

Just got up. Um, I'd like to encircle house Bill 2 79.

Fifth Substitute House Bill 180 2 Genetic Information Amendments by Representative Brooks.

Thank you Mr. Speaker. Motion to concur with the Senate.

Yeah. They made a a few adjustments to make sure that it works better with the genetic sequencing material, where they're getting from, how they're using it. It's a good, good addition.